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Using data from labour force surveys conducted simultaneously in the
capital cities of seven WAEMU countries, we estimate a model of residen-
tial location choice, in which expected earnings play a role. The model is
first estimated in a reduced form. Estimates are then used to correct for
the endogeneity of locational choice in earnings equations estimated for
each country. We find that migration behaviour has a significant effect
in shaping earnings differentials between education levels and between
the seven capital cities. A minimum distance estimator is then used to
recover the value of log-earnings in the structural model of residential lo-
cation choice. Results show that individuals tend to reside in countries in
which their expected earnings are higher than elsewhere.





Migration from and to African countries is an extensive phenomenon. Accord-
ing to recent estimates by the United Nations Population Division, the total
number of international migrants in Africa rose from nine millions in 1960 to
16 millions in 2000. West Africa in particular has a long history of population
mobility, both regionally and internationally. Linked with factors as diverse as
long-distance trade, plantation agriculture, urbanisation but also armed con-
flict, land degradation, drought, etc., migration in the region played and still
plays a major part in shaping settlement patterns. At a political level, several
initiatives have facilitated labor migration, among which the free movement of
persons institutionalized by the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS).
With this background in mind, the purpose of this paper is to examine
the locational choice of a large sample of Africans originating from the West
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Historically, in the economic
literature the concern with migration emerged with the work of Sjaastad (1962).
In the development literature, however, Todaro (1969) and Harris & Todaro
(1970) are the first to present a model in which the decision to migrate results
from the rational comparison of the expected costs and benefits of migration.
In both models, the difference in average expected earnings between countries
or regions of destination and countries or regions of origin plays a key role
and is predicted to have a positive effect on migration flows. However this
kind of model is unable to explain key stylized facts, such as migration flows
from and to particular regions or countries. For instance, in Africa, a sizable
number of people living in Benin come from Togo and an equally sizable number
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of people residing in Togo are natives from Benin. Borjas (1987) and, more
recently, Dahl (2002) have adopted a rather different approach, based on the
seminal paper of Roy (1951). In Roy’s framework, workers select themselves in
income earning activities on the basis of their comparative advantage. Applied
to residential choice, this model explains migration not by average expected
earning differentials, but rather by differences in individual expected returns
to skills that are either observed or unobserved by the econometrician. As a
result migration flows are not necessarily one-sided. Another conclusion of this
literature is that migrants’ self selection should be taken into account when
estimating the returns to human capital in countries where the flow of migrants
is significant. Dahl (2002) for instance, in a study of migration between states
of the USA, estimates a Roy model and finds that correcting for selection bias
substantially changes the estimated returns to education in a sense that supports
the role of comparative advantage in mobility decisions. He also finds that
migration flows depend positively on the differences in the corrected returns to
education.
Estimation of this kind of model is usually very difficult due to the im-
possibility to gather data on the origin and destination labour markets at the
same time. In this paper we use a unique collection of data originating from
the PARSTAT project sponsored by the WAEMU.1 Representative household
quantitative surveys have been conducted simultaneously in the capital cities
of seven member States of the WAEMU (Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar,
Lome, Ouagadougou and Niamey) in 2001-2002. The surveys provide detailed
1The PARSTAT project was coordinated by AFRISTAT, under the scientific supervision of
Alain Brilleau (DIAL-INSEE), Eloi Ouedraogo (AFRISTAT) and François Roubaud (DIAL-
IRD). See Amegashie, Brilleau, Coulibaly, Koriko, Ouedraogo, Roubaud & Torelli (2005) for
details on the project and Brilleau, Roubaud & Torelli (2005) for extensive descriptive results.
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information for all individuals aged 10 or more within each sample household,
relating to education and training, employment, unemployment and earnings.
Furthermore, data on country of birth and last country of residence allow to
identify international migrants within each national sample.
Our purpose in the paper is threefold. First, we fill a gap in the knowledge
of cross-border migrations within Africa, using our sample data to compare the
characteristics of migrants with those of non migrants in their countries of ori-
gin and destination. Second, we want to evaluate the extent of the bias in the
estimated returns to education, when international migration is not accounted
for. Third, we want to determine whether or not earnings differentials matter
in the choice of the country of residence. In the model that follows we assume
that individuals are born randomly in one of the seven countries under review,
but then rationally choose the country in which they reside by comparing the
utilities associated with each choice. Estimation of this model provides unbi-
ased estimates of the returns to education, together with the effect of expected
earnings differentials on the probability of choosing one particular country. We
find that migration behaviour plays an important role in determining earnings
differentials between countries and between individuals with different educa-
tion levels. Moreover, our results suggest that earnings differentials matter in
locational choice.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
Movements of labour in Sub-Saharan Africa are not a new phenomenon. Over
the generations people have migrated in response to demographic, economic,
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political an other related factors, such as population pressure, environmental
disasters, poverty and conflicts. In pre-colonial West Africa, migrations were
generally circular, seasonal and of short duration, and occurred largely from
unsecure or drought-prone regions to more secure and fertile regions (Adepoju
2005). Colonialism significantly altered the motivation and migration patterns
in this region by introducing far reaching structural changes. In particular, the
development of transportation systems, the monetization of the economy and
the deliberate development of mining enclaves and plantation agriculture to-
gether with a series of recruitment policies (compulsory recruitment, contract
and forced labour legislation and agreements) stimulated regional labour migra-
tion fromMali, Togo and Upper Volta to Gold Coast and Côte d’Ivoire (Adepoju
2005, Adebusoye 2006). These socio-economic and historical factors have shaped
contemporary patterns of migration between African countries. However, with
the end of colonialism and largely in response to growing disparities in living
standards, inter-continental migration in the direction of Northern developed
countries has been a growing phenomenon for the last fourty years.
Despite their importance, yet little is known about these migrations. The in-
formation provided by census data, immigration and emigration statistics and
a small number of ad hoc surveys on the number, identity and motivations
of both inter- and intra-continental African migrants is indeed far from being
complete and reliable. In particular, estimates on the number of African in-
ternational migrants widely differ between sources: they range from about 16
million according to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM, 2003)
to 50 million according to the African Union (AU, 2005). Evidence is even more
scarce concerning trans-border migrations within the West African sub-region.
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How many trans-border migrants are there in each West-African country? Who
are these migrants? What are their main motivations ? Here are some of the
questions we want to address in this paper.
Our data come from representative household quantitative surveys (the 1-2-3
Surveys on Employment, Informal Sector, Consumption and Poverty) conducted
simultaneously in the capital cities of Benin (Cotonou), Burkina Faso (Oua-
gadougou), Cote d’Ivoire (Abidjan), Mali (Bamako), Niger (Niamey), Senegal
(Dakar) and Togo (Lome) in 2001-2002. These countries are all members of
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).2 The creation of
ECOWAS, in 1975, responded to the recognition by West African leaders that
intra-regional integration could be an important step towards the region’s col-
lective integration into the global economy. The key objective of the Community
was thus to remove obstacles to the free movement of goods, capital and people
in the sub-region. In line with this objective, the Protocol on Free Movement
of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment was signed in May
1979. A transition period followed, during which the rights of entry (in 1980)
and residence (in 1986) were established. More recently, in 2000, members of
the ECOWAS agreed to introduce a new passport for citizens of the sub-region
that will progressively replace national passports. Even though much remains
to be done in order to achieve a complete liberalization of labour migration
within the community - some countries are still restricting foreigners, including
community nationals, from participating in certain kinds of economic activities
- all these measures taken to create a borderless West Africa provide a good
2ECOWAS groups 15 countries: 5 English speaking countries (Gambia, Ghana, Liberia,
Nigeria, Sierra Leone), 8 French speaking countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Ivory Coast,
Malin, Niger, Senegal, Togo) and 2 sharing Portuguese as their official language (Guinea Bissau
and Cape Verde).
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opportunity to study the residential choice of people within the community.
Moreover, amongst the ECOWAS members, the countries of our sample are all
French-speaking countries and are all members of another community, namely
the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).3 As such they
share the CFA franc as a common currency. These common features undoubt-
edly facilitate labour migration.
Implemented by National Statistical Institutes in conjunction with AFRI-
STAT and the IRD Research Unit DIAL, the 1-2-3 Surveys provide detailed
information for all individuals aged 10 or more within each sample household
relating to education and training, employment, unemployment and earnings.
Furthermore, data on country of birth and last country of residence allow us to
identify migrants within each national sample. More details on the survey can
be found in Amegashie et al. (2005).
Table 1 reports the composition of each national sample. For ease of com-
putation, are considered as natives of country i all individuals who have resided
in country i on a permanent basis, whether they declare having country i’s
citizenship or not. In the empirical analysis that follows, we restrict the sam-
ple to all active individuals aged 16 or more, originating from one of the seven
countries covered by the 1-2-3 survey and residing in the capital city of one of
these countries either as natives or as immigrants. To avoid confusion, all indi-
3Created in 1994, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) is com-
posed of eight member States: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali,
Niger, Senegal and Togo. Some of the principal objectives of WAEMU are to: (i) strengthen
competitiveness of the economic and financial activities of the member States within the
context of a free and competitive common market and a rationalised and harmonised legal
environment; (ii) achieve convergence of the performance and economic policies of the mem-
ber countries; and (iii) create a common market among the member countries based on free
movement of persons, goods, services, and capital and the right of establishment of persons
engaged in an independent or salaried employment, and on a common external tariff and trade
policy.
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viduals included in the sample appear in bold in Table 1. As suggested by the
figures, there is a wide variety of migration configurations within the WAEMU.
Figures first suggest that despite the severe sociopolitical crisis that started in
1999 with a military coup d’Etat, Cote d’Ivoire is still, by far, the most im-
portant immigration country in the WAEMU region.4 Extrapolation from the
Ivorian sample reveals that 15.9 per cent of Abidjan’s inhabitants aged 16 or
more are immigrants among which 74 per cent are citizens of a WAEMU coun-
try (see Table 2 for extrapolated figures). Even though migration flows from
Burkina Faso and Mali have been fluctuating since the beginning of the crisis,
these two neighboring countries remain the main providers of migrants to Cote
d’Ivoire. By contrast, immigrants from bordering countries only account for a
marginal share of the population in Ouagadougou, Bamako and Dakar. Last,
a quick comparison of row and column totals by country suggests that Malian
and Burkinabe expatriates residing in the capital city of a WAEMU country
largely outnumber the expatriates from WAEMU countries residing in Bamako
or Ouagadougou, suggesting that Mali and Burkina Faso have been and still are
major labour-exporting countries. Benin and Togo, by contrast, combine both
emigration and immigration.
Table 3 provides some descriptive statistics on the main characteristics of
natives and immigrants by country of residence. Figures first suggest that com-
pared to natives, females are under-represented in the immigrant population
of Ouagadougou, Abidjan and Lome while they are slightly over-represented in
that of Cotonou, Bamako and Niamey. Traditional male-dominated short-to-
long distance migratory streams in West Africa are thus increasingly feminised,
4The civil war in Côte d’Ivoire started in september 2002, a few months after the completion
of the 1-2-3 survey.
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suggesting a turn-around in traditional sex roles. Second, no clear pattern
emerges with regard to age. Immigrants are significantly older on average than
natives in Abidjan and Niamey but are roughly of the same age in all the other
capital cities. Third, immigrants appear to be less educated on average than na-
tives in four capital cities out of seven (Cotonou, Abidjan, Niamey and Lome).
As a result, the percentage of non graduate individuals among migrants in these
four cities is much higher than among natives. The education gap is particularly
pronounced in Abidjan where immigrants have two years of schooling on average
against 6.6 for natives. By contrast, with more than eight years of schooling,
immigrants in Dakar appear much more educated on average than natives. Due
to small sample size, however, this last figure should to be taken with caution.
As a complement to Table 3, Table 4 provides some descriptive statistics on
the main characteristics of non-migrant natives and emigrants, or “stayers” and
“movers”, by WAEMU country. In most countries, males are over-represented
in the emigrant population except in Togo and, to a lesser extent, in Benin.
Intra-regional migratory flows from these two countries are mostly motivated
by commercial purposes and have traditionally been female-dominated. In terms
of education, emigrants appear much less educated than non-migrant natives in
all countries, suggesting that migration flows within the WAEMU region mainly
concern low-qualified workers.
Last, Table 5 provides descriptive statistics on the employment situation of
natives and immigrants by country of residence. On average, labour force partic-
ipation is higher for immigrants than for natives. The difference is particularly
strong in the cases of Abidjan and Niamey, suggesting that migration streams to
these two capital cities are mainly motivated by labour market considerations.
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Given the individual characteristics of immigrants, particularly with respect to
their level of education, one would expect their employment situation to be
less favourable than that of natives in Cotonou, Abidjan, Niamey and Lome
and more favourable in Dakar. In the context of labour markets in developing
economies, a favourable situation is that of formal wage workers in the public
or private sector, in contrast to the situation of informal workers. Formal wage
workers usually enjoy higher wages, more job security and more benefits than
informal workers. Figures indicate that this is indeed the case. The percentage
of immigrants working in the informal sector is much higher than that of natives
in Cotonou, Abidjan, Bamako, Niamey and Lome while it is lower in Dakar and
in Ouagadougou. Average hourly earnings roughly follow the same pattern.
Compared to natives, immigrants are indeed found to enjoy much lower hourly
wages on average in Cotonou (-26%), Abidjan (-36%) and Niamey (-29%) while
they enjoy much higher hourly wages in Dakar (+172%), Lome (+39%) and
Bamako (+28%). Figures for Dakar and Bamako should however be considered
with great care given small sample size. Lome stands as an exception since its
immigrants are less educated on average, are more concentrated in the informal
sector but enjoy significantly higher hourly wages than natives.
3 Model specification and estimation strategy
We study the locational choice of individuals originating from one of the seven
countries of the PARSTAT project. Each individual has the choice to settle
in any of these seven countries. We assume that individuals behave as if they
maximize a stochastic utility function, where utility is a function of the distri-
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bution of earnings in the chosen location. The question is whether differences in
individual specific mean earnings determine locational choice. The difficulty is
that, since we observe earnings at only one location for each individual, poten-
tial earnings at other locations must be imputed and, in doing so, it is necessary
to hold account of the fact that location choice is not random, but partly com-
manded by earnings differences. Thus our estimation strategy proceeds in three
steps. In the first step a multinomial logit model of locational choice is estimated
using a reduced form specification. The results from this estimation are then
used to compute appropriate correction terms that are added as independent
variables in Mincer-type earnings equations. Results from this second step are
then used to identify the effect of expected earnings differentials in locational
choice.
We assume that individual i, born in country j, and living in country k has
a utility ui(j, k) given by :
ui(j, k) = α. ln yik + z
0
iγk + vi(j, k) (1)
with ln yik the logarithm of the individual’s hourly earnings in country k and
zi a vector of individual characteristics. An increase in labour market earnings
provides identical gains in utility, independently of the country of residence.
This might be too strong an assumption if large differences exist between coun-
tries in the set of available goods and their price. For instance health services
could be free of charge in one country and very costly in another. This would
impact on the living standards of people with identical incomes but not living in
the same country. In the present case, the data we use come from very similar
countries: all of them are former French colonies and they share a common cur-
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rency. Moreover, all surveyed individuals live in capital cities, between which
differences in markets are likely to be smaller than between urban and rural
areas. In addition to earnings, we assume that utilities are impacted by individ-
ual characteristics, zi, with the size and sign of the impact depending upon the
country of residence. For instance, countries in the WAEMU largely differ by
their population’s religious composition: more than 90% of the population liv-
ing in Dakar (Senegal), Bamako (Mali) and Niamey (Niger) is muslim, against
about 10% in Lome (Togo) or Cotonou (Benin). Ceteris paribus, individuals
of a given confession might prefer to live in countries where this confession is
well represented. As a result, being a Muslim should have a positive impact on
utility for people living in Dakar, Bamako and Niamey, but a zero or even a
negative impact for people living in Lome or Cotonou.
Individual i decides to live in country k if this choice provides more utility
than living in any other country, that is:
ui(j, k) ≥ ui(j, l) for any l. (2)
We are particularly interested in estimating α in equation (1). Since ln yik is
only observed for individuals living in country k, estimation has to proceed in
several steps. First, we assume that each individual living in country k faces a
Mincer-type earnings equation:
ln yik = x
0
ik.βk + uik (3)
where xik is a vector of individual characteristics such as sex, education or
labour market potential experience. Second, we substitute ln yik in equation (1)
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and get utility in a reduced form:




iγk + εi(j, k)
where εi(j, k) = αuik + vi(j, k).
Under the assumption that εi(j, k) has a generalized extreme value distribu-
tion, it can be shown that:
























with P the total number of locations and βαk = αβk. This is known as the
multinomial logit model and is well documented in standard reference textbooks.
Results from this reduced form estimation can then be used to correct for
endogenous selection in the earnings equations.5 As shown by Lee (1983), it is
possible to adapt the two steps method suggested by Heckman (1979) to the
case of polychotomous choice models. His intuition is that the dimension of the
problem can be reduced by substituting the P selection equations in (2) by the
single condition that:
5The multinomial logit suffers from the Independance of Irrelevant Alternatives assump-
tion, which in most cases is unlikely to hold. However based on Monte-Carlo simulations,
Bourguignon et al (2004) conclude that ”selection bias correction based on the multinomial
logit model seems a reasonable alternative to multinomial models when the focus is on estimat-
ing an outcome over selected populations rather than on estimating the selection process itself.
This seems even true when the IIA hypothesis is severely at odds.” We are then confident
that our choice of the multinomial logit should not bias our results.
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maxl(ui(j, l)− ui(j, k)) ≤ 0
Then, transforming to normal the cumulative distribution function of the
maximum order statistic achieves the transformation of the P-dimensional joint
distribution of the earnings and selection equations error terms to one of a bi-
variate normal distribution, in which the Heckman procedure can be applied.
However, as shown by Schmertmann (1994) and more recently by Dahl (2002)
and Bourguignon, Fournier & Gurgand (2004), Lee’s method implies very strong
restrictions on the correlation structure of the earnings and selection equations
disturbances. Dahl (2002) suggests a non parametric method that is less de-
manding. Moreover, as shown by Bourguignon et al. (2004), Lee’s method is
only adapted to very small samples so that non parametric methods should be
preferred for larger samples . In this paper we thus use Dahl’s correction method
and Bourguignon et al. (2004)’s Stata program to estimate our model.
In a last step, we compute a minimum distance estimator to recover the
value of the coefficient of log-earnings in the structural model of residential
choice (Gourieroux & Monfort 1995). According to the structural model, the
following set of constraints has to be satisfied between coefficients of equations
(1), (3) and (4):
cβαk − α.(bβk − bβ0) = 0 for k = 1 to 6. (5)
where index 000 refers to the reference country in the reduced form multinomial
logit equation.6 This is a system of 6K equations, where K is the number
6 In the multinomial logit model, only the differences βαk − βα0 , where 0 is the index of a
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of variables in the xik vector. Let θ = (cβα1 0, ..,cβα6 0, bβ00, .., bβ06)0 be the vector
of estimated coefficients in the first and second steps of the estimation. The
constraints system of equation can be written:
g(bθ, α) = 0
Following Gourieroux & Monfort (1995), we can estimate α using asymptotic
least squares. The optimal value of α, bα, verifies:




∂bθ0 .bΩ.∂g(bθ,bα)0∂bθ i−1 and bΩ = V ar(bθ).7 In order to account for
the fact that the estimation is done in several steps, the entire procedure has
been bootstrapped with 50 replications and bootstrapped standard errors used
whenever necessary.
4 Model identification and choice of variables
In order to be identified, our model relies on various assumptions that need
to be properly tested. In particular, in the second step of our procedure in
which we correct for individuals’ self-selection, it is important to have one or
more variables that explain locational choice (i.e. that enter the first stage
equation) but do not influence earnings. In what follows, we use dummies for the
individual’s religion and nationality as identifying variables. Religion is indeed
likely to have an influence on destination choice given that large differences
reference country, can be identified.





exist between countries in their population’s dominant religions. Nationality
dummies are also included to account for macro-level variables, such as average
GDP per capita, mortality rates or the shares of immigrants from ECOWAS
countries in the country’s population. We test these exclusion restrictions by
including in turn religion and nationality dummies in the list of explanatory
variables in the earnings equations. The joint significance of excluded regressors
is then tested by a Wald test. When both sets of regressors are added, the model
remains identifiable, however identification can be weak because it rests on the
non-linearity of the correction terms in the earnings equations.8 Nonetheless,
we use this property to test for the validity of our exclusion restrictions.
In the third stage of our procedure, identification of the log-earnings coeffi-
cient, α, in the structural model of residential choice depends upon the exclusion
from equation (1) of at least one variable that enters in the log-earnings equa-
tion (3). Here we assume that sex, education and employment sector explain
log-hourly earnings but not residential choice, once earnings are accounted for.
There are some good reasons for which education could determine residential
choice, apart from its impact on potential earnings. One possibility is that well
educated individuals might prefer countries where the average level of educa-
tion is high, not only because their own wages are going to be higher, but also
because they will benefit from positive externalities related to this high average
level of education (such as a higher supply of cultural goods for instance). In
our case, however, since the average level of education is low in all the capital
cities of our sample, we believe such incentives to be small.
In the earnings equation our dependent variable is the logarithm of total
8See, for instance, Wooldridge (2002)
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hourly earnings in CFA francs. All earnings are expressed in purchasing power
parity (PPP). The conversion to PPP CFA francs is necessary in the third step of
our estimation, where the individual’s expected earnings in the seven countries
are allowed to influence the probability of choice. The PPP conversion factors
we use are those published by the World Bank in its World Bank Indicators
(World Bank 2003). Independent variables in the earnings equations are sex,
education (as measured by the last diploma obtained), potential labour market
experience and its square, the abilities to speak french and another foreign
language, two dummies for the public or private formal sectors and a series of
dummies for the father’s activity when the individual was 15. This last set of
variables is included both as a determinant of migration behaviour and as a
proxy for the individual’s sector choice, to account for the earnings differentials
between the different sectors of the economy. The reduced form multinomial
logit model includes these variables, together with dummies for the individual’s
religion and nationality.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Reduced form multinomial logit of residential choice
Estimation results are presented in Tables 6 and 7. Table 6 shows the results of
the reduced form multinomial logit estimation. These are uneasy to comment
because only the differences βαk − βα0 can be identified, where 0 is the index
of a reference country (Senegal in our case). Thus, for instance, the positive
coefficient of the sex variable in the equation for Benin tells that being a male
increases relatively more the utility resulting from choosing Benin than the util-
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ity resulting from choosing Senegal. However it does not mean that being a
male increases the utility associated with Benin in absolute terms, as it could
happen that 0 > βαk > β
α
0 . The results suggest that, among the seven countries
under review, holding the baccalaureate increases more (or decreases less) the
utility to reside in any other country than that of residing in Senegal. By con-
trast, holding a postgraduate degree increases the utility of residing in Senegal
much more than that of residing in any other country. The same holds true for
people of muslim or catholic confession. Unsurprisingly, we also find that being
of Senegalese nationality increases much more the utility to reside in Senegal
than that of residing in any other country, with the exception of Mali, but the
coefficient is insignificant (results not shown).
5.2 Earnings equations
Following Dahl (2002), the estimated coefficients of the reduced form multino-
mial logit have been used to compute, for each observation of the sample, a
vector of choice probabilities. A two-order polynomial of these probabilities has
then been added to the list of explanatory variables in the Mincer-type earn-
ings equations in order to correct for the endogenous selection of the country
of residence.9 The resulting equations have been estimated by OLS. Since our
estimation strategy is a multi-step procedure, the entire process has been boot-
strapped with 50 replications and bootstrapped standard errors have been used
9 In other words, if only three choices were possible, for each individual we would compute
P1, P2 and P3 the probabilities of each choice, then add to the income equation P2, P3, P12,
P22, P32, P1*P2, P1*P3 and P2*P3 as independent variables. A one order polynomial could
have been chosen but, as shown by Bourguignon et al. (2004), in this case Dahl’s and Lee’s
methods yield similar results and estimates are strongly biased when the restrictions that
Lee’s method imposes on the data are not met. A higher order polynomial could also have
been considered, but with seven possible choices the number of correction terms increases very
rapidly, so a polynomial of order two appears a reasonable choice.
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for hypothesis testing. Results are presented in Table 7. As the coefficients of
the polynomials of the selection probabilities have no interpretation and because
of space limitations, we limit the presentation to the coefficients of the variables
that have a direct interpretation. The first column shows the estimated co-
efficients when no correction for endogenous selection is applied. The second
column presents the corrected coefficients and the third column the results of
a Hausman-type test for differences between the corrected and uncorrected es-
timated coefficients of the education, experience and language variables. The
results of a series of Wald tests are also shown at the bottom of Table 7. Several
test statistics were computed. First, we test whether the selection correction
terms enter the earnings equation significantly. Second, we test the hypothesis
that our excluded variables, that is the religion and nationality dummies, have
no significant contribution to the explanation of the dependent variable, namely
log-earnings. When both groups are included, identification is achieved through
the non linearity of the choice probabilities (see supra).10
We find that for two countries, namely Cote d’Ivoire and Mali, we can reject
the hypothesis that the coefficients of the polynomials included to correct for
endogenous selection are all zero.Turning to the overidentification tests, the
results allow us to conclude to the correct identification of our model: in all cases
but one, Wald test statistics are found to be insignificant, indicating that the
vector of variables used to instrument residential choice does not contribute to
the determination of earnings, once the correction terms are included. Exception
is Lome for which the null hypothesis is rejected, but at the 10% level and when
only one group of identifying variables (religion dummies) is included in the
10All tests are based on bootstrapped standard errors.
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regression.
In Benin, Senegal and Niger, and to a lesser extent in Côte d’Ivoire and Togo,
correcting for endogenous selection appears to change significantly the estimated
returns to education. Except for Mali, the education coefficients in the corrected
equations are almost uniformly lower than the uncorrected coefficients. For
example, in Benin, Senegal and Niger, the coefficient on “Foundation degree”
drops respectively by 13%, 12.5% and 23% when correcting for self-selection.11
In other words, self-selection leads to upward biases in the returns to education,
implying that migrants in a given country share unobserved characteristics that
make their earnings higher than average. However, the variation in returns
to education between capital cities does not narrow, suggesting that country-
specific amenities and other unmeasurable non-wage variables play important
roles in the locational choice of individuals with different levels of education.
5.3 Structural model of residential choice
The last question we examine in this paper is whether earnings differentials
matter in locational choice. To this end, we compute the minimum distance
estimator of α using estimated coefficients from the reduced form multinomial
logit and from the selectivity corrected earnings equations. Results are shown in
Table 8, second row.12 To assess the importance of correcting for the endogenous
selection of the country of residence, we also present the estimate obtained when
no correction is applied (see first row). As can be seen from the Table, correcting
for endogenous selection does not dramatically change the results. In both cases,
11These countries’ university system derives from the French system, in which, until recently,
second-year students could get a diploma. We refer to it as the "foundation" degree.
12 Standard deviations are computed using first and second stage bootstrap standard errors.
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we find that individuals tend to locate in countries where their expected earnings
are higher.
How robust are these results?
Since our results might be sensitive to some of the assumptions we made due
to the limitations of our data, we conducted a series of robustness checks.
As a first check, we used another estimation method in the third stage of our
whole procedure. Indeed, another way to recover the value of α is to compute
unconditional earnings predictions, for each individual in each possible location,
using unbiased estimates of βk and proceed to the estimation of the following
structural conditional logit model:
P (i lives in k) = P (Mi(j) = k) =
exp(α dln yik + z0iγk)PP
l=1 exp(α
dln yil + z0iγl) (6)
This alternative method does not impose the linear restrictions between the
coefficient values that result from the structural model (see equation 5). Re-
sults appear in Table 8, third row. While the coefficient of α is lower than
that obtained using the minimum distance estimator, it is still significantly pos-
itive, bringing additional support to the idea that individuals tend to locate in
countries where their expected earnings are higher.
As a second robustness check, in the second stage of our estimation proce-
dure we run a Heckman selection model using data on participants and non-
participants to the labour market, instead of running an OLS regression on
participants only. Indeed, in the foregoing estimations, due to the difficulty
of controlling both for the endogenous selection of locational choice and for
labour force participation, our sample was restricted to labour market partici-
pants. This limitation is naturally a potential source of bias in our estimates.
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The identifying variable in the Heckman selection model is marital status (i.e.
whether the individual is married or not), which is assumed to influence labor
market participation but not earnings. Results obtained in the third stage were
not affected by this change, suggesting negligible biases.
Third, we checked whether self-selected internal migration affected the ob-
served returns to education but found no evidence of a selection bias.
Last, since our results might depend upon the set of conversion factors used
to convert current CFA francs to PPP, we re-run our model using another set
of conversion factors. The latter have been computed in 1998 by ASECNA and
have been actualized through 2001 using national inflation rates.13 Once again,
this modification did not change dramatically our results.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we use a unique set of identical labour force surveys that allow
to observe at the same time migrants in seven WAEMU countries and their
country of origin’s labour market. We use these data first to document the
patterns of migration flows in the sub-region, second to estimate the determi-
nants of migration behaviour across these countries and finally to correct the
estimated returns to education for the endogeneity of locational choice. We then
use a minimum distance estimator to evaluate the impact of expected earnings
differentials on the probability of selecting a particular country to reside in.
Our results show that, despite the severe political crisis that started in
13ASECNA is the Agence pour la Sécurité de la Navigation Aérienne en Afrique et à Mada-
gascar. This agency computed its own PPP conversion factors, based on prices observed in
the African capital cities, in order to give the same wage to its agents in terms of purchasing
power.
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1999, Cote d’Ivoire remains the most important immigration country in the
sub-region. Our data also suggests that Mali and Burkina Faso have been and
still are major labour-exporting countries, largely towards Cote d’Ivoire. Benin
and Togo, by contrast, combine both emigration and immigration. Looking at
migrants characteristics we find that migrants tend to be less educated than
non migrants in both their origin and destination country. Thus cross-border
migration within the sub-region seems to concern mainly low educated individ-
uals. They are more likely than natives to work in the informal sector and they
receive lower wages.
Our econometric results suggest that not holding account of international
migration in estimating returns to education yields upward biased estimates in
three countries out of seven. However, the variation in returns to education be-
tween capital cities does not narrow, suggesting that country-specific amenities
and other unmeasurable non-wage variables play important roles in the loca-
tional choice of individuals with different levels of education. We also find that
expected earnings differentials have a very significant effect on the choice prob-
abilities: all else equal, people tend to live in countries in which their expected
earnings are higher than elsewhere.
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Table 1 - Composition of national samples
Benin Burkina Faso
Cote 
d'Ivoire Mali Niger Senegal Togo Other n.d.
Benin - 4 6 15 58 3 104 135 18 343 7,030 7,373
nationals (*) - 4 6 15 55 2 102 36 16 236
Burkina Faso 11 - 7 8 2 1 16 18 11 74 8,108 8,182
of which WAEMU nationals 6 - 7 7 0 1 16 5 7 49
Cote d'Ivoire 54 413 - 242 89 65 78 315 135 1391 5,871 7,262
of which WAEMU nationals 54 410 - 229 84 63 73 122 126 1161
Mali 8 14 11 - 8 14 0 64 7 126 7,077 7,203
of which WAEMU nationals 3 13 10 - 6 13 0 37 5 87
Niger 76 47 4 122 - 5 59 52 28 393 7,550 7,943
of which WAEMU nationals 65 47 4 122 - 5 48 27 25 343
Senegal 10 0 3 10 0 - 5 133 52 213 11,764 11,977
of which WAEMU nationals 6 0 2 9 0 - 2 74 34 127
Togo 87 9 9 11 51 3 - 109 23 302 5,873 6,175
of which WAEMU nationals 76 9 8 11 44 3 - 22 21 194
Total 246 487 40 408 208 91 262 826 274
of which WAEMU nationals 210 483 37 393 189 87 241 323 234
Source: 1-2-3 Surveys, 1st round, 2001-2003, National Statistical Institutes, AFRISTAT and DIAL. Authors' computations.
having the country's citizenship or not. In bold are all sample individuals who will be considered in the analysis.
(*) Within the sample of immigrants coming from one of the six WAEMU countries, some individuals are not WAEMU nationals (Exemple : A French 
national who spent 10 years in Burkina Faso before moving to Benin is recorded as an immigrant coming from Burkina Faso but is not Burkinabe).
Number of sample individuals coming from: Total sample 
size







Table 2 - (Weighted) share of immigrants among urban residents by WAEMU country (%)
Bénin Burkina Côte d'Ivoire Mali Niger Sénégal Togo
Natives 96.4 99.3 84.1 98.4 95.6 98.5 95.5
Immigrants 3.6 0.7 15.9 1.6 4.4 1.6 4.5
of which:
coming from WAEMU 60.6 70.7 73.5 43.8 85.7 13.0 60.7
coming from other developing countries 36.4 23.9 25.2 43.4 12.2 83.9 38.8
coming from developed countries 3.1 6.2 1.3 12.6 2.2 3.1 0.8
Source: 1-2-3 Surveys, 1st round, 2001-2003, National Statistical Institutes, AFRISTAT and DIAL. Authors' computations.
Table 3 - Mean characteristics of natives and immigrants by country of residence
Natives Natives Natives Natives Natives Natives Natives
% of males 48.4 42.4 51.0 56.8 48.1 61.8 * 49.7 46.7 48.8 45.7 47.3 47.4 47.7 58.3 *
Age in years 33.5 31.8 32.4 31.9 30.0 35.8 * 33.4 33.2 32.6 35.2 * 33.4 37.2 32.2 32.1
Education and experience
Experience in years 20.9 22.2 21.4 20.3 17.5 27.9 * 22.7 21.5 21.6 26.9 * 22.1 22.9 19.6 21.7 *
Years of schooling 6.6 3.6 * 5.0 5.6 6.6 1.9 * 4.7 5.4 5.0 2.3 * 5.2 8.3 * 6.6 4.4 *
% with no diploma 46.5 72.8 * 56.2 54.1 44.7 84.7 * 59.8 60.0 61.6 81.8 * 61.3 36.8 * 43.3 63.6 *
% with completed primary education 25.6 14.7 * 22.4 13.5 26.6 9.3 * 17.5 13.3 19.0 11.3 * 17.1 15.8 30.9 24.5 *
% with BEPC 13.2 6.0 * 11.4 18.9 10.6 2.4 * 8.0 4.4 7.4 2.4 * 11.1 15.8 14.8 4.6 *
% with baccalaureat 4.0 3.8 2.7 0.0 4.9 0.7 * 2.2 6.7 * 2.7 0.0 * 3.9 5.3 3.2 1.3
Can read&write in French 70.7 36.4 * 57.3 62.2 73.2 26.8 * 47.6 46.7 54.8 29.6 * 58.7 73.7 72.5 52.3 *
Can read&write in a foreign language 24.1 26.1 13.1 27.0 * 24.9 10.8 * 12.3 33.3 * 21.4 18.2 19.1 42.1 * 26.7 23.2
Religion
% of muslim 9.7 46.2 * 56.2 40.5 * 31.0 73.6 * 97.3 80.0 * 98.3 77.0 * 93.2 57.9 * 9.4 49.0 *
% of catholic 67.8 32.1 * 35.9 16.2 * 35.8 17.4 * 1.7 17.8 * 1.1 18.9 * 6.6 42.1 * 47.9 22.5 *
% of protestant 5.1 3.8 6.5 27.0 * 10.8 3.5 * 0.5 2.2 0.4 3.4 * 0.1 0.0 10.3 1.3 *
Number of observations 7,030 184 8,108 37 5,871 913 7,077 45 7,550 291 11,764 19 5,873 151
Source: 1-2-3 Surveys, 1st round, 2001-2003, National Statistical Institutes, AFRISTAT and DIAL. Authors' computations.
A "*" means that the difference is statistically significant
Niger Senegal TogoBenin Burkina Faso Cote d'Ivoire Mali
Immigrants ImmigrantsImmigrants Immigrants Immigrants ImmigrantsImmigrants
Table 4 - Mean characteristics of natives and emigrants by country of residence
Natives Natives Natives Natives Natives Emigrants Natives Natives
% of males 48.4 46.7 51.0 58.8 * 48.1 51.4 49.7 58.0 * 48.8 68.3 * 47.3 70.1 * 47.7 39.4 *
Age in years 33.5 34.6 * 32.4 36.1 * 30.0 29.4 33.4 36.3 * 32.6 32.0 33.4 38.2 * 32.2 31.4
Education and experience
Experience in years 20.9 23.4 * 21.4 28.6 * 17.5 17.1 22.7 29.1 * 21.6 23.7 * 22.1 27.8 * 19.6 21.3 *
Years of schooling 6.6 5.2 * 5.0 1.6 * 6.6 6.3 4.7 1.1 * 5.0 2.3 * 5.2 4.1 * 6.6 4.1 *
% with no diploma 46.5 56.2 * 56.2 87.8 * 44.7 45.9 59.8 91.1 * 61.6 81.5 * 61.3 66.7 43.3 68.9 *
% with completed primary education 25.6 23.3 22.4 8.1 * 26.6 18.9 17.5 6.1 * 19.0 11.6 * 17.1 13.8 30.9 17.8 *
% with BEPC 13.2 7.6 * 11.4 1.7 * 10.6 8.1 8.0 1.0 * 7.4 2.6 * 11.1 6.9 14.8 7.1 *
% with baccalaureat 4.0 1.0 * 2.7 0.4 * 4.9 8.1 2.2 0.3 * 2.7 1.6 3.9 6.9 3.2 0.8 *
Can read&write in French 70.7 56.2 * 57.3 25.5 * 73.2 62.2 47.6 15.8 * 54.8 27.5 * 58.7 50.6 72.5 46.9 *
Can read&write in a foreign language 24.1 19.5 13.1 8.1 * 24.9 37.8 * 12.3 13.2 21.4 32.1 * 19.1 21.8 26.7 17.4 *
Religion
% of muslim 9.7 26.2 * 56.2 70.6 * 31.0 51.4 * 97.3 99.0 * 98.3 96.3 93.2 86.2 * 9.4 23.2 *
% of catholic 67.8 38.6 * 35.9 25.1 * 35.8 16.2 * 1.7 0.3 * 1.1 1.6 6.6 10.3 47.9 44.8
% of protestant 5.1 7.6 6.5 2.3 * 10.8 2.7 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.1 1.1 * 10.3 12.0
Number of observations 7,030 210 8,108 483 5,871 37 7,077 393 7,550 189 11,764 87 5,873 241
Source: 1-2-3 Surveys, 1st round, 2001-2003, National Statistical Institutes, AFRISTAT and DIAL. Authors' computations.
A "*" means that the difference is statistically significant
Emigrants Emigrants
TogoSenegalNigerMali
Emigrants Emigrants Emigrants Emigrants
Cote d'IvoireBurkina FasoBenin
Table 5 - Employment situation of natives and immigrants, by country of residence
Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants
Employment situation
% of employed 67.5 70.1 57.1 56.8 60.7 77.7 57.6 55.6 48.4 66.3 50.1 57.9 70.5 77.5
% of unemployed 4.1 2.2 11.0 18.9 11.5 4.7 4.2 2.2 8.0 3.8 7.5 0.0 6.8 4.0
% of inactive 28.4 27.7 31.9 24.3 27.8 17.6 38.1 42.2 43.6 29.9 42.4 42.1 22.7 18.5
Number of observations 7,030 184 8,108 37 5,871 913 7,077 45 7,550 291 11,764 19 5,873 151
Sector of activity & wage of the employed
% in the public sector 8.9 0.0 14.0 9.5 8.4 1.0 11.6 4.0 18.0 1.0 9.1 0.0 8.2 1.7
% in the formal private sector 11.7 10.9 9.1 19.1 21.5 12.6 11.8 8.0 13.5 10.4 17.9 36.4 8.3 12.0
% in the informal private sector 79.4 89.1 76.9 71.4 70.1 86.5 76.6 88.0 68.5 88.6 73.0 63.6 83.6 86.3
Hourly wage in PPP CFA Francs 200 144 384 369 356 228 340 434 487 344 421 1,090 309 428
Number of observations 4,745 129 4,630 21 3,564 709 4,076 25 3,654 193 5,894 11 4,140 117
Source: 1-2-3 Surveys, 1st round, 2001-2003, National Statistical Institutes, AFRISTAT and DIAL. Authors' computations.
Niger Senegal TogoBenin Burkina Faso Cote d'Ivoire Mali













Lome       
(Togo)
Sex (1: Male) 0.96*** 0.79** 1.36*** 0.24 0.37 1.13***
(0.33) (0.31) (0.29) (0.32) (0.32) (0.33)
CEP (Primary school completed) -0.63 0.45 -0.20 -0.01 -0.34 -0.05
(0.50) (0.49) (0.45) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
BEPC (GCSE) -0.69 1.17* 0.04 0.33 -0.47 -0.12
(0.64) (0.67) (0.57) (0.70) (0.66) (0.64)
CAP -0.73 1.95* 0.83 2.01* 0.20 -0.76
(1.13) (1.16) (1.03) (1.15) (1.16) (1.13)
BEP -2.96 1.27 -0.88 0.66 -0.68 -0.05
(1.90) (1.96) (1.81) (1.80) (1.85) (1.85)
Baccalaureate 1.50* 2.54*** 1.32** 1.57* 1.57** 1.87**
(0.79) (0.88) (0.60) (0.86) (0.78) (0.77)
Foundation degree -2.18 1.40 -0.08 0.57 -0.53 -1.00
(1.70) (1.81) (1.66) (1.75) (1.75) (1.75)
Bachelor's degree -1.99* 0.32 -0.99 0.04 -0.57 -1.65
(1.09) (1.14) (1.03) (1.10) (1.09) (1.10)
Postgraduate degree -5.01*** -3.65*** -4.39*** -3.51*** -3.57*** -4.92***
(0.97) (1.14) (1.02) (1.05) (1.02) (1.03)
Marital status (1: Married) -0.45 -0.70** -0.89*** -0.14 -0.50 -0.53
(0.34) (0.33) (0.30) (0.33) (0.33) (0.34)
Speaks French (1=Yes) -0.14 0.00 -0.20 -0.02 0.29 0.25
(0.39) (0.36) (0.33) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38)
Speaks another Foreign Language (1=Yes) 1.01** -0.04 0.10 -0.21 0.11 0.92**
(0.41) (0.40) (0.36) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40)
Experience (in years) 0.06 0.05 0.16*** -0.00 0.10** 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Experience Squared -0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Public sector -0.07 0.58 -1.53*** 0.30 -0.09 -0.23
(0.60) (0.64) (0.57) (0.61) (0.60) (0.60)
Private sector 0.12 -0.86** -0.18 0.26 0.16 -0.27
(0.42) (0.39) (0.35) (0.40) (0.40) (0.42)
Father in the agricultural sector -0.27 -0.06 0.44 -0.51 -0.17 -0.10
(0.36) (0.34) (0.32) (0.34) (0.35) (0.35)
Father in the industrial sector -0.81 -0.59 0.04 -0.38 -0.29 -0.63
(0.57) (0.59) (0.49) (0.57) (0.58) (0.57)
Father in the commercial sector 0.61 1.16*** 1.20*** 0.89** 0.52 1.01**
(0.40) (0.38) (0.32) (0.37) (0.38) (0.40)
Father was a top executive 0.79 2.43*** 1.55** 1.65** 1.64** 1.10
(0.74) (0.81) (0.63) (0.75) (0.75) (0.74)
Father was a middle executive 1.17** 0.97 0.75 1.18* 1.24** 0.56
(0.60) (0.63) (0.54) (0.61) (0.60) (0.59)
Father never went to school 1.20*** 1.85*** 1.17*** 0.59* 1.53*** 0.74**
(0.33) (0.32) (0.29) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33)
Muslim -4.44*** -3.98*** -4.17*** -4.15*** -1.57 -5.29***
(1.31) (1.35) (1.29) (1.40) (1.37) (1.31)
Catholic -2.68** -3.03** -3.41** -3.48** -1.69 -3.86***
(1.34) (1.38) (1.33) (1.45) (1.40) (1.34)
Protestant -1.31 0.33 -0.66 -1.71 0.38 -2.13
(1.76) (1.79) (1.73) (1.88) (1.82) (1.75)
Nationality dummies
Intercept -7.03*** -8.12*** -4.65*** -3.96** -9.08*** -5.49***
(1.80) (1.85) (1.46) (1.61) (1.66) (1.59)
Observations 31,426 31,426 31,426 31,426 31,426 31,426
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Included but not shown
Table 7 - Earnings regression - uncorrected (1st column) and corrected (2nd column) estimates
Sex (1: Male) 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.42*** 0.26*** 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.35*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.16* -0.10** -0.20** 0.34*** 0.29***
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07)
CEP (Primary school completed) 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.04 0.40*** 0.33*** 1.11 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.27 0.22*** 0.23** 0.06 0.52*** 0.45*** 1.48 0.35*** 0.32*** 2.61 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.05
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.14) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.09) (0.13) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09)
BEPC (GCSE) 0.96*** 0.92*** 1.24 1.27*** 1.23*** 0.17 1.16*** 1.16*** 0.22 0.47*** 0.54*** 0.91 1.06*** 0.92*** 4,57** 0.55*** 0.45*** 9,18*** 1.05*** 1.02*** 0.54
(0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.17) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.13) (0.16) (0.09) (0.13) (0.10) (0.13)
CAP 1.15*** 0.83*** 8,92*** 1.17*** 1.08*** 0.55 1.21*** 1.21*** 0.02 0.45*** 0.57*** 0.74 1.49*** 1.16*** 3,20* 0.71*** 0.22 8,83*** 1.06*** 0.89*** 2,74*
(0.15) (0.25) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (0.15) (0.12) (0.22) (0.23) (0.26) (0.24) (0.39) (0.23) (0.25)
BEP 0.97** 0.83 0.15 1.71*** 1.58*** 1.05 1.15*** 1.07*** 2,80* 0.95*** 1.04*** 0.65 1.31*** 1.01*** 1.78 0.83*** 0.66** 8,05*** 1.23*** 1.27*** 0.13
(0.47) (0.83) (0.25) (0.32) (0.19) (0.15) (0.11) (0.18) (0.20) (0.29) (0.26) (0.24) (0.23) (0.18)
Baccalaureate 1.33*** 1.36*** 0.66 1.81*** 1.79*** 0.06 1.69*** 1.70*** 0.04 0.75*** 0.76*** 0.01 1.86*** 1.90*** 0.68 0.92*** 1.01*** 0.39 1.57*** 1.56*** 0.01
(0.15) (0.12) (0.19) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) (0.20) (0.27) (0.19) (0.23) (0.14) (0.29) (0.17) (0.19)
Foundation degree 2.03*** 1.77*** 4,68** 2.06*** 1.97*** 0.55 2.04*** 2.01*** 0.64 0.96*** 1.10*** 1.57 1.87*** 1.44*** 5,32** 1.12*** 0.98*** 7,98*** 2.65*** 2.58*** 0.79
(0.20) (0.32) (0.22) (0.32) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.19) (0.25) (0.33) (0.25) (0.19) (0.28) (0.20)
Bachelor's degree 1.91*** 1.76*** 6,07** 2.36*** 2.30*** 0.33 2.27*** 2.23*** 1.15 1.36*** 1.50*** 2.09 2.25*** 2.02*** 3,41* 1.36*** 1.30*** 1.92 2.45*** 2.47*** 0.17
(0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.19) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.20) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.14)
Postgraduate degree 1.68*** 1.23*** 7,42*** 1.56*** 1.49*** 0.68 1.80*** 1.83*** 0.29 1.11*** 1.11 0 1.99*** 1.82*** 2.32 1.36*** 1.33*** 0.29 2.05*** 1.92*** 0.56
(0.18) (0.28) (0.23) (0.29) (0.21) (0.19) (0.23) (0.74) (0.17) (0.20) (0.18) (0.17) (0.26) (0.33)
Marital status (1: Married) 0.66*** 0.69*** 0.38*** 0.46*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.46*** 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.55*** 0.37*** 0.41*** 0.52*** 0.54***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Speaks French (1: Yes) 0.14** 0.21*** 11,27*** 0.42*** 0.46*** 0.89 0.07 0.09 2.58 0.23*** 0.22** 0.14 0.26*** 0.34*** 2 0.30*** 0.35*** 8,10*** 0.06 0.11 3,65*
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.11) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Speaks a foreign language (1: Yes 0.35*** 0.44*** 6,55** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.03 0.18** 0.19** 0.01 0.14** -0.01 4,82** 0.08 0.26** 4,14** 0.35*** 0.40*** 1.97 0.03 0.02 0.15
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.11) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10)
Experience (in years) 0.13*** 0.13*** 1.86 0.13*** 0.12*** 2.13 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.36 0.07*** 0.06*** 1.98 0.13*** 0.12*** 1.89 0.12*** 0.11*** 1.59 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.16
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Experience squared -0.00*** -0.00*** 3,17* -0.00*** -0.001*** 2.01 -0.00*** -0.001*** 0.1 -0.00*** -0.001*** 1.44 -0.00*** -0.001*** 2.69 -0.00*** -0.001*** 4,92* -0.00*** -0.001*** 0.47
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Public sector 0.30*** 0.41*** 0.69*** 0.83*** 0.72*** 0.63*** 0.34*** 0.45*** 0.49*** 0.63*** 0.80*** 0.88*** 0.68*** 0.68***
(0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.16) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Private sector 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.44*** 0.54*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.18*** 0.26** 0.31*** 0.37*** 0.80*** 0.83*** 0.33*** 0.34***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.08) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
Father in the agricultural sector -0.01 -0.07 -0.18*** -0.32*** -0.09* -0.10* -0.12** -0.22*** -0.03 -0.17* 0.01 -0.06 0.05 0.03
(0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Father in the industrial sector 0.13 0.03 -0.30* -0.36 -0.19** -0.20 -0.05 -0.07 -0.15 -0.24 -0.11 -0.13 -0.08 -0.08
(0.09) (0.12) (0.15) (0.27) (0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.13) (0.14) (0.23) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11)
Father in the commercial sector 0.08 0.05 0.03 -0.08 -0.03 -0.05 0.07 0.06 -0.10 -0.23 0.04 -0.11 0.10 0.04
(0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.14) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.9)
Father was a top executive 0.26** 0.19 0.18 0.22 0.38*** 0.39** 0.41*** 0.42*** -0.14 -0.31 0.25** 0.09 0.13 0.11
(0.12) (0.20) (0.16) (0.21) (0.14) (0.18) (0.10) (0.16) (0.16) (0.24) (0.13) (0.21) (0.16) (0.20)
Father was a middle executive 0.22*** 0.22** 0.09 0.16 -0.06 -0.09 0.12* 0.14 -0.03 -0.00 0.11 0.10 -0.05 -0.04
(0.07) (0.09) (0.12) (0.15) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.09) (0.15) (0.09) (0.09)
Father never went to school -0.01 -0.00 -0.05 0.05 0.06 0.09* -0.03 -0.05 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.04 -0.19*** -0.18**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.15) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.11) (0.07) (0.12) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07)
Intercept 1.04*** 1.58*** 2.16*** 3.01*** 1.91*** 2.34*** 1.88***
(0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10)
Observations 4,723 4,453 4,188 4,022 3,686 5,383 4,193
R-squared 0.41 0.39 0.40 0.31 0.38 0.32 0.33
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Wald test for selection correction 
terms 41.0 23.6 49.1** 51.88** 36.70 22.34 26.14
Over-identification Wald Tests
One group added
- Religion dummies 5.89 2.90 2.65 1.27 2.72 0.20 9.00*
- Nationality dummies 2.00 0.04 2.91 0.79 1.54 1.04 4.57
Both groups added 6.36 2.92 4.58 1.53 4.18 1.00 10.64
Niamey (Niger) Dakar (Senegal) Lome (Togo)Cotonou (Benin) Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire) Bamako (Mali)
Table 8 - Results of third step minimum distance estimation







Standard deviations are reported between parentheses.
***: significant at the 1% level.
Uncorrected model
Corrected model
Conditional logit estimation
